Article
A recent survey showed that 56% of people in Great Britain now believe it was wrong to leave the European Union and that Brexit has had a mainly negative impact, particularly on the economy and the cost of living. Given the relentless stream of negative headlines over recent years, this is hardly surprising.
The Brexit process was chaotic, prolonged and politically exhausting. It took three years of deadlock before the UK finally left the EU on 31 January 2020. Complex negotiations over the terms of departure were compounded by ideological divisions, parliamentary paralysis and the fact that, for much of the process, the Conservative government lacked a working majority. Deadlines were repeatedly missed and public confidence steadily eroded.
Yet while Britain formally left the EU, Brexit remains incomplete. Many EU-derived laws still remain in force, the Windsor Framework continues to generate negotiation and adjustment, and Britain is still making payments under the Withdrawal Agreement.
From the very beginning, Britain’s relationship with Europe was uneasy. The founding fathers of the European project dreamed of “ever closer union”; Britain approached Europe far more pragmatically. While many on the continent viewed the EU as a political destiny, Britain largely saw it as an economic arrangement.
The Brexit negotiations themselves became yet another chapter in the centuries-long diplomatic rivalry between Britain and France. Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator, embodied the French tradition of centralised, top-down negotiation rooted in the Napoleonic legal culture, whereas Britain’s approach has always been more pragmatic and grounded in common law traditions. These differences matter. David Cameron’s failed renegotiation in 2016 demonstrated how poorly British leaders sometimes understood the political culture of Brussels. He promised reforms that the EU was never realistically prepared to concede, and the complexity of the final package convinced the Eurosceptics. Looking at the current government’s repeated U-turns and lack of strategic clarity, there is little reason to feel more confident this time round.
At heart, however, the debate is about the British national interest. Does moving back towards closer EU alignment truly serve Britain’s long-term economic and political interests as an outward-looking, offshore trading nation?
Supporters of a “reset” argue that Britain’s economy would be stronger had we remained in the EU. Yet many of these claims are based on hypothetical comparisons with a counterfactual scenario that can never be proved. Assertions of lower growth, weaker productivity and reduced investment are often difficult to separate from other global shocks, including Covid, the energy crisis, inflation and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.
One of the most repeated claims is that Brexit “shrunk the economy by 4%”. In reality, this figure stems from an Office for Budget Responsibility estimate based not on actual economic decline, but on projected “missed future growth” over many years. Meanwhile, major EU economies such as Germany and France are themselves struggling with stagnation, industrial decline, rising debt and political fragmentation.
Equally misleading are claims that a “reset” would dramatically reduce food prices or revive trade. Britain already has a zero-tariff trade deal with the EU. Food inflation in the UK has often been lower than in parts of the EU, and outside the customs union Britain can import more competitively from global markets, including Australia and New Zealand.
Claims that exports to the EU have collapsed are similarly overstated. British services exports have remained strong, while goods exports have broadly followed wider international trends. Imports from the EU have fallen somewhat, but that partly reflects Britain’s ability to source goods more competitively elsewhere.
Brexit also created important opportunities which are too often ignored. Economic autonomy has allowed Britain to negotiate independent trade agreements tailored to British interests, reduce certain regulatory burdens, set its own VAT rules, determine its own immigration rules (though admittedly not successfully, mainly because of the European Convention of Human Rights) and pursue innovation in areas previously constrained by EU regulations, including gene-editing and life sciences.
Most importantly of all, Britain now has the freedom to develop more agile regulatory frameworks for the industries of the future — artificial intelligence, fintech, biotechnology and advanced life sciences. While The EU is moving towards a highly prescriptive AI regime, the UK is pursuing a more flexible, pro-innovation approach. Rejoining or dynamically aligning with the EU would risk stifling precisely the industries that are likely to drive growth in the decades ahead.
A “reset” risks undermining these advantages. Regulatory alignment on food standards could gradually pull Britain back into aspects of the Single Market. Youth mobility schemes may become a form of free movement by another name. EU proposals on emissions trading and carbon border taxes could increase costs for British industry while tying Britain once again to EU policy decisions.
And who is to say that the EU even wants Britain back on favourable terms? Some member states — France in particular — have never forgiven Britain for leaving. Brussels will also be wary of appearing too accommodating when other countries are queueing to join and could demand similar concessions. Sir Julian King, Britain’s last European Commissioner, warned that the UK would almost certainly lose Margaret Thatcher’s budget rebate, immediately increasing Britain’s contribution by billions each year. Britain would also lose the opt-outs it once secured from the euro, Schengen and aspects of EU asylum policy.
In reality, the EU would make re-entry or close alignment as difficult and expensive as possible. Britain could face vast new financial contributions — estimates range from £15 billion to £22 billion annually — alongside demands for alignment across energy, fishing, agriculture, student mobility, migration, gene-editing and financial regulation. Much of this would come under the seemingly harmless phrase “dynamic alignment”; in practice, the gradual reimposition of EU laws by the back door.
There also remains the essential democratic question: how much sovereignty is Britain prepared to surrender in exchange for relatively modest economic gains? Margaret Thatcher understood that Britain could only negotiate successfully with Brussels by being absolutely clear about its bottom line. That clarity is absent today.
Brexit was never a promise of instant perfection. It was about restoring sovereignty, flexibility and democratic accountability. The question facing Britain today is not whether every aspect of Brexit has been flawless, but whether the country is better placed governing itself or drifting back towards dependence on a European system increasingly burdened by economic weakness, overregulation and political strain.
Sir Keir Starmer presents a “reset” as a route to growth and economic stability and sees it as a way to save his failing Premiership, claiming that closer ties with the EU will boost growth. The road to growth is not paved by bigger government, more regulation and higher taxes. It has simply diverted the attention from where the root of the problem really lies.
Britain’s current economic difficulties stem essentially from the current government’s domestic policies. Rising public spending, higher taxation, overregulation and measures such as the Employment Rights Bill are weakening business confidence, investment and growth. Borrowing costs are at their highest level in 28 years, debt interest consumes a growing share of public spending, and youth unemployment remains worrying, hitting new highs of 16%.
The idea that closer alignment with Brussels will suddenly unlock growth is optimistic at best. More regulation, higher costs and deeper political entanglement are unlikely to revive Britain’s economy. They may instead reignite the very divisions Brexit created.
None of this means Britain should not cooperate closely with its European neighbours. Of course, we should. Britain should trade, collaborate, and maintain strong diplomatic and security ties with Europe. But eventual rejoining of the European Union – or a “rest” that recreates membership obligations by stealth — would require Britain to surrender flexibility, accept major financial liabilities and re-enter systems that were not always designed in Britain’s national interest.
At a time when agility, innovation, and strategic independence are more important than ever it would be, quite simply, a mistake.
